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Prospects For Developing Countries
Under the TRIPs Agreement
Ruth L. Gana*
ABSTRACT

This Article focuses on the future impact of the TRIPs
Agreement on developing countries with regard to patent
and copyright protection.
While some scholars have
suggested that the intellectual property protection provided
by the TRIPs Agreement significantly benefits developing
countries just as well as such protection has benefited
developed countries in terms of increased economic growth
and development, the authorof this Article disagrees. Upon
close analysis of the TRIPs Agreement's impact on
developing countries, including the use of illustrative
examples and a case study of the People's Republic of
China with regard to copyright protection, this author
concludes that developing countries will not enjoy such
economic development unless they implement the legal,
economic, and political structures associated with free
market systems. According to the author,transformation in
the legal, economic, and political structures of developing
countries is vital in order to encourage economic growth.
However, such changes must be relevant to the social and
culturalframeworkof developing countries. The patent and
copyright protection provided by the TRIPs Agreement will
not, by itself, transform developing countries into the
thriving technology producers that they aspireto become.
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Oddi, and Jerome Reichman for their comments which improved this article, and
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I. INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE GATT SYSTEM

Any attempt to evaluate the impact of the TRIPs Agreement' in
developing countries must begin with an examination of the broader
question: what do developing countries aspire to under the
multilateral trade system? 2 Like the developed countries, developing
countries seek the large scale economic gains which dominant
economic theory assures are offered by a multilateral system of trade.

1.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].

For one perspective of the general impact of the Uruguay Round on
2.
developing countries see Michael Rom. Some Early Reflections on the Uruguay
Round Agreement as Seen from the Viewpoint of a Developing Country, J. WORLD
TRADE, Dec. 1994. at 5, 6 (concluding the Round may result in more benefits than
losses in terms of concessions for developing countries as a whole but "there
seems to be a real regression from the achievements [previously] attained").
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Yet, for most of the history of the multilateral trading system,
developing countries clearly remained on the periphery, their
relationship to developed countries tainted deeply with mistrust
Thus while developing
stemming from the colonial experience.
countries desired to participate in the existing international economic
framework as sovereign states, their attitude was often belligerent.
They demanded compensation, in the form of concessions, from
developed countries for the wrongs of colonialism without a

corresponding commitment to shoulder the full obligations of
membership in the multilateral system.
In the last decade, changes in the domestic economic capabilities
of some former developing countries in Asia and Latin America and
the need for large scale capital generation in developing countries as
a whole yielded a conscious commitment to be more deeply integrated
in the world trade system. Undoubtedly, the requirement for large
volumes of commerce as a stimulant to achieve greater levels of
growth and development remains the primary motivation behind
developing countries' interests in participating in the multilateral
trade system. In tension with this objective is the concomitant
requirement to relinquish sovereign freedom to pursue policies
presumed to stimulate indigenous innovative activity in a manner
that had been inconsistent with pre-TRIPs Agreement intellectual
property agreements. Intellectual property as enshrined in the TRIPs
Agreement directly implicates a vital and consistent demand by
developing countries, namely, the freedom to use transborder
The
technology flows to accomplish socio-economic objectives.
merger of trade and intellectual property under the Uruguay Round
is, thus, for developing countries, a matter of means rather than
Although trade-offs between developed and developing
ends.
countries under the Uruguay Round deflected the usual conflict
between developed and developing countries over intellectual
property protection,4 the salient issue still remains whether, in this
new era of greater involvement at the multilateral level, the TRIPs
Agreement signals an end to the use of intellectual property as an
instrument for development or whether the TRIPs Agreement still
affords a possible means to pursue development objectives. Indeed,

As former colonies, developing countries were involved in the
3.
international economic system through the policies of individual colonial
authorities. The result of this participation in the international economic system
placed the direction and growth of developing countries' economies in primarily
European hands, where developing countries were used as producers of raw
materials.
J. H. Reichman, Implications of the Draft TRIPs Agreement for
4.
Developing Countries as Competitors in an Integrated Market, UNCTAD Discussion
Paper No. 73, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/DP/73 (1993).
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the persistent conundrum is whether intellectual property protection
has a determining impact on development, as some have suggested,5

or if, as this author argues, its transformative potential is freed only
by the existence

of legal,

economic,

and political structures

associated with free market systems in which property rights play a
pivotal role.
To be taken seriously in developing countries,
intellectual property rights must interact with existing social
structures to promote indigenous technological innovation and
capital development.
Without the specific conditions of strong
property systems, stable government, free market capitalism, and

zealous protection of corporate interests, it is unlikely that-modem

intellectual property in and of itself has the potential to transform
developing countries into the technology producers they aspire to
become.
Consequently, the likely success of TRIPs Agreement

enforcement, and of intellectual property rights in general, will
correspond with the degree to which each developing country has
implemented reforms that are somewhat consistent with free market
democratic principles.
The question of whether it is possible to pursue traditional
strategies for development within the TRIPs Agreement regime
provides an important framework for evaluation, not only because the
TRIPs Agreement is an integral part of the WTO system,6 but also
because the multilateral trade framework envisages economic
relationships based on trade-offs between countries.7 No country in

5.

See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC

Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of
Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, J. WORLD TRADE, Sept.
1990, at 75, 77-90.
6.
The Uruguay Round Agreement overhauled the pre-existing trade
regime. Significantly, the Round introduced new subject matters, such as
intellectual property and trade in services, into the multilateral trade framework.
It established an institutional apparatus, the World Trade Organization (WTO), for
the administration and enforcement of the Agreement and established a new
dispute resolution process. The integration of these vital aspects of the new
system was accomplished by a "single package" principle which requires nations
to ratify all of the core agreements which comprise the new system. Membership
in the new WTO is accomplished by accession or original membership. See WTO
Agreement, supra note 1, arts. XI-XII. Adherence to the Charter automatically
subjects a state to all the annexed agreements with the exception of the optional
Plurilateral Agreements. The mandatory annexes are Annex 1A, which comprises
GATT 1994, Annex 1B, which comprises the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), Annex 1C, which comprises the TRIPs Agreement, Annex 2,
which comprises the Dispute Settlement Rules, and Annex 3, which comprises
DEVELOPMENT (1990);

the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 20, 325, 365, 404, 434 (GATT Secretariat ed.,

1994).
7.
The theory of comparative advantage, which informs the multilateral
trade system, assumes countries will trade in goods they are better at producing
relative to other countries. Multilateral free trade, based on this theory, envisages
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the specific history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) or in the general history of international economic relations
has come away from multilateral negotiations with total victory.
Rather, the significant objective has been that each country benefits

from new and improved concessions in specific areas at the end of

the negotiating process.

Indeed, the lack of avid participation by

developing countries in pre-Uruguay Round trade negotiations is
attributable to the perception that the system yielded no concrete
benefits to them. This was a strongly felt and legitimately held

conviction,

particularly

since

developed

countries

had

long

maintained barriers against key exports from developing countries in
the area of textiles and agricultural products. 9 At the same time, the
GATT system made these countries vulnerable to arbitrary unilateral
The Uruguay Round made
actions by developed countries.
substantial inroads into these concerns by reforming the dispute
resolution system, accomplishing cuts in tariffs on tropical products,
and completing an agreement to phase out the Multifiber
The relationship of
Arrangement over a period of ten years.10
developing countries to the TRIPs Agreement thus may be regarded
as a bargained-for-exchange-intellectual property protection for fair
trade rules in specific industries" that should have been in place for

tradeoffs by participating countries in the form of worker displacement in less
competitive domestic industries, dependency on imports, and, to some degree,
reduced control over national trade balances. In return, countries benefit from
increased opportunities to penetrate new markets abroad, and global welfare is
increased by efficiencies engendered by specialization and increased production.
See generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (5th ed. 1973)
(examining the theory of comparative advantage with respect to multilateral free
trade).
See Michael W. Gordon, Remarks, Economic Development in the Third
8.
World: What Can Be Expectedfrom the GATT Uruguay Round?, in 81 PROC. OF THE
AM. Soc. OF INT'L L. 578, 579 (1987) (noting a 1949 analysis by the U.S. Tariff
Commission "showed that concessions granted to developing nations in the 1947
Geneva negotiations were insignificant" and a report commissioned by GATT and
prepared by trade experts concluded that "developing countries were losing under
the GATT").
Historically, textiles and agriculture have been controversial in the
9.
course of trade negotiations. Under the auspices of the GATT, trade in textiles

was governed by a separate agreement which legitimated protectionism by
developed countries.

Similarly, trade in agriculture enjoyed special treatment,

deviating from the general GATT rules against non-discrimination and quotas.
See Sanjoy Bagchi, The Integrationof the Textile Trade into GATT, J. WORLD TRADE,
Dec. 1994, at 31 (advocating the basic obligations in the GATT as a measure to
combat protectionism); see also, Emmanuel 0. Awuku, How Do the Results of the
Uruguay Round Affect the North-South Trade?,J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1994, at 75.
10.

JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

RELATIONS 1125 (3d ed. 1995).
The Uruguay Round has been referred to as a "global negotiation with
11.
a global result." See Statement of the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations
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the system to work the way that it purports to work.
While It
appears that the Uruguay Round achieved some sort of procedural
balance in the negotiating process, close examination of the TRIPs
Agreement reveals an overall disproportionate burden in the area of
intellectual property protection in developing countries12 without any
tangible development benefit. In other words, developing countries
may have gotten some "benefits" in the agreements over textiles and

agriculture, 13 but the concems over the impact of an international
intellectual property regime on development objectives remain
unchanged from what existed in the pre-TRIPs Agreement era, and
their ability to avoid those principles of protection which undermine
development goals has been severely restricted by the TRIPs
Agreement.
The central concern of this Article is how developing countries
will fare under a TRIPs Agreement regime and correspondingly, how
the TRIPs Agreement will fare in developing countries. The Article
does not attempt to distinguish among developing countries.
However, it is important to point out that the countries which are the
primary targets of the TRIPs Agreement are most notably countries,
such as India, Brazil, and China, which are on the cusp of
development. These countries are in the process of transition from
underdeveloped to developed and thus, are legitimate "developing"
countries. The immense potential their markets offer to foreign
investors and the increasing level of technological sophistication

Committee, Peter Sutherland, reproduced in 081 NEWS
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF

(Info. & Media Rel. Division of the GATT,

Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 21, 1993, at 2. Participation by developing countries was
more significant than previously had been the case. A report on developing
countries and the global trading system, supported by the Ford Foundation,
indicates that the differences between developed and developing countries over
trade matters have undergone more change during the Uruguay era than at any
other time since World War II. As a result, the report concludes there may be
more willingness on both sides to support the system and enjoy its benefits while
also paying its costs. See John Whalley, The Uruguay Round and Beyond: The
Final Reportfrom the Ford Foundation Supported Project on Developing Countries
and the Global Trading System (1989), excerpts reproduced in JACKSON ET AL.,

supra note 10, at 1118-24 (discussing the interest of developing countries in tle
trading system and the impact of changes in this system on the Uruguay Round).
12.
See Carlos M. Correa, TRIPs: An Asymmetric Negotiation, 1993 THIRD
WORLD ECON.
9, 10 (arguing the TRIPs Agreement does not reflect
interdependence, but rather is "essentially asymmetric, non-transparent and
autocratic" and reflects imbalances in the comparative effects on developing
countries' intellectual property laws).
13.
The concessions given to developing countries in textiles and
agriculture are certainly an improvement over what previously existed in these
areas. However, the value of these concessions, particularly in the area of
textiles, cannot be used to offset the costs of higher protection for intellectual
property since the restrictions were contrary to the GATT arrangements in the
first place.
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already evident in these economies were significant factors in the
motivation to merge trade and intellectual property rights.
This Article examines the prospects for strategies of economic
development which hold access to technology as a central element of
the development process. Because the primary concern is the impact
of the TRIPs Agreement on traditional development strategies, the
focus of this Article is limited to patent and copyright law and some
specific provisions in these two areas of the TRIPs Agreement, which
ostensibly leave some margin for maneuverability by developing
countries. This margin, even if limited, is an important point of focus
for several reasons.
4
First, the Uruguay Round, through its accomplishments,1 is

indicative of a general movement in the Western hemisphere to reorder the basis of economic relationships.15 This is the case
particularly for the United States which, in the early 1980's, began a
gradual but fundamental transformation from a manufacturing to an
information-based economy. Trade in information goods is regulated
primarily by copyright principles, which also encompass the
"7
protection of new technologies.

The "public goods problem,

intrinsic to information goods, and the ease with which these goods
are duplicated necessitated a restructuring of rules which govern
The embodiment of this
international economic conduct.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See Harry B. Ensley, Intellectual Property Rights in the GATT, 15 NENw
MATrER 1 (1990) (quoting Arthur Dunkel).
The incorporation of new technologies such as computer software and
16.
digital technologies within copyright has generated significant debate among
scholars. Currently, most countries protect new technologies under the auspices
of copyright legislation as opposed to sul generis protection. See Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, Databases,and Computer-Generated
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV.978 (1993) (arguing the
protection of computer software, databases and computer-generated works under
the copyright statute has proved to be a valid option for the United States). For
an opposing perspective, see Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case
Against Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs In Machine-Readable Form,
1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 663 (1984) (recommending sul geners legislation for
computer programs and arguing that CONTU "failed to take into account the
historical [role] of disclosure... as a fundamental goal of... copyright" and the
fact that the U.S. copyright "statute and the case law make clear that utilitarian
works are not copyrightable").
This characterization refers to the fact that unlike manufactured
17.
goods, the market value of an information good does not diminish necessarily
with its use. On the economics of public goods in general, see Harold Demsetz,
The PrivateProductionof Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970); see also Wendy
J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural and Economic Analysts of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1610-14 (1982)
(identifying public goods as a type of market failure that intellectual property
attempts to solve).
14.
15.
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restructuring is the TRIPs Agreement, that focuses on the capture of
economic rent from the international exploitation of intellectual
property. However, unlike domestic legislation, which seeks to
balance the economic interests of owners of intellectual property
against the public interest in having access to new knowledge,' 8 the
TRIPs Agreement is concerned primarily with protection and not, as
such, with dissemination.' 9 To this end, the Agreement provides no
meaningful or cognizable balance within the framework of
international economic relations. 20
There certainly is a public
interest in free competition which makes possible efficiency gains,

18.
Anglo-American jurisprudence, in both the copyright and patent areas,
has a rich tradition of justifying the intellectual property system on the basis of
perceived gains thereby bestowed on society at large. In the area of patent law,
early cases established the primacy of disclosure to the public as a crucial tenet
of the patent grant. In Househill Co. v. Neilson, reprinted in THOMAS WEBSTER,
REPORTS & NOTES OF CASES ON LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS (1601-1843) 719,
the court observed, for example, that "Ihe is not called the inventor who has in
his closet invented it, but who does not communicate it: the first person who
discloses that invention to the public is considered as the Inventor ... [though]
another may have invented it and concealed it." See also Dolland's Case,
reprinted in Id. at 43 (explaining the timing of the invention's disclosure is the
source of argument); Lewis v. Marling, reprinted In Id. at 496 (stating "if I make a
discovery... it is no objection that someone else has to my claim to a patent
made a similar discovery by his mind, unless it has become public"). Similarly, in
the area of copyright law, American courts have long held that copyright envisions
use by members of the public. See Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 131 F.
Supp. 165, 174-75 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Karll v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 39 F. Supp. 836,

837 (E.D. Wis. 1941). The notorious fair use doctrine, as applied by American
courts, is used to balance these rights in a manner deemed by the judiciary as
best reflecting the purposes of the American copyright system, namely, the
enhancement of public welfare. Fair use jurisprudence is deployed to achieve
this end by limiting control of a copyrighted work. See Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985) (stating "copyright is intended to
increase and not impede the harvest of knowledge").
19.
There is a token attempt made in favor of dissemination in the area of
patents under Article 29 of the TRIPs Agreement. Article 29 provides:
Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the
invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to
be carried out by a person skilled in the art and may require the applicant
to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the
inventor at the filing date or, where priority Is claimed, at the priority date
of the application.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 29. As patent lawyers are well aware,
however, there are means, in practice, to prevent full disclosure.
20.
The implications of this are serious with regard to developing
countries.
Access to new knowledge is key to development objectives.
Development as a process of transformation is, like innovation, dependent on the
infusion of new methods and new advances into a society, thereby increasing
social welfare by enhancing standards of living. For this purpose, technology is
not just a commodity in the stream of commerce but, in addition, a means to
achieve necessary ends for the improved living conditions of a people.
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such as lower prices, diversification, and specialization. The question
which continues to plague domestic proprietary regimes and which is
aggravated at the international level by the wide gap between rich
and poor countries is where to set the balance between access and
competition. Antitrust rules and sophisticated regulatory institutions
in developed countries make the balance a feasible, even if difficult,
objective. The same cannot be said of the international system. If,
contrary to the position of this Article, the protection of intellectual
property is vital for development, 2 ' then developing countries have
22
much more at stake under this new system than ever before.
Second, most developing countries continue to remain on the
periphery of international economic relations.2 3 The nature and
scope of their participation in the multilateral trade framework has
long been a contentious subject of international law. The protection
of intellectual property under the multilateral trade system has
raised, anew, concerns about prospects for developing countries to
progress beyond current levels of development which remain, with
The allocation and enforcement of
few exceptions, very low.
directly relevant to transborder
are
rights
property
intellectual
have an impact on development
turn,
in
technology flows which,
The TRIPs Agreement, if strictly enforced, should
objectives.

therefore be understood as a significant factor in shaping the course
of development in several countries over the next few years. Indeed,
the point the TRIPs Agreement attempts to legitimize is not whether
intellectual property rights may, or should, be used as a vehicle to
achieve national development and prosperity, but rather, how the
control of these rights determines the direction and beneficiaries of
that development. The extent to which conflicting local law and

21.

See Friedrich-Karl Beier, The SignIficance of the Patent System for

Technical, Economic and Social Progress, 11 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT

L. 563, 569 (1980) (arguing that the patent system "constitutes a proven,
indispensable instrument for technical, economic and social progress"). One of
the reasons developing countries acceded initially to other major intellectual
property treaties was the emphasis that intellectual property protection was a key
part of Western industrial success and development. This point continues to
dominate the economic literature about intellectual property protection and to
justify encouraging developing countries to join the system.
See Hanns Ullrich, GATT: IndustrialProperty Protection,Fair Trade and
22.
Development. in GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 11 STUDIES IN INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 127 (Friedrich-

Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989).
The Uruguay Round is credited with having drawn the participation of
23.
developing countries in the trade negotiations at an unprecedented level.
However, only a handful of developing countries were notably active. These
include Brazil, India, South Korea and several Latin American countries which led
developing country resistance to the merger of intellectual property in the
international economic system.
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custom may impede the application of the TRIPs Agreement and the
implications of the potential incompatibility of TRIPs Agreement with
other social institutions in developing countries are not substantively
addressed by the Agreement. 24 Yet this issue is of significant
importance in assessing enforcement prospects, as well as in
determining the feasibility of the system for the benefit the of
developing countries. This Article agrees with the prevailing wisdom
which suggests that the TRIPs Agreement is skewed to benefit the
economic interests of developed countries. However, even if the
Agreement were a perfect balance of competing interests, there is still
a fundamental need for the bulk of developing countries to implement
policies in critical areas, such as education and research and
development funding, and to develop a sound infrastructure if an
intellectual property regime will contribute at all to national
prosperity.
The TRIPs Agreement leaves some room for developing countries
to develop domestic laws which conform to specific national concerns
and thus to use intellectual property to further development goals.
This may be accomplished, in part, by drawing on existing limitations
in the domestic legislation of developed countries which remain valid

within the auspices of the TRIPs Agreement.

Thus, this Article's

analysis proceeds in three parts. Part II examines developing
countries and patent protection under the TRIPs Agreement. Part III
examines developing countries and copyright protection under the
TRIPs Agreement. Finally, Part IV examines the possibilities of
enforcement.
I. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND PATENT PROTECTION UNDER THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT

The failed attempts to revise the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property in light of requests by developing
countries froze the status quo of international patent protection for
thirteen years.26 Some developing countries chose not to join the

24.
It may be argued, quite validly, that ratification of the TRIPs Agreement
requires countries to do away with any conflicting laws. This point, however, fails
to recognize the role and strength of extra legal Institutions in many developing
countries, as harbingers of what the population considers "binding" as a matter of
law. Later sections of this paper examine this phenomenon.
25.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, as last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter

Paris Convention].
26.
The last revision conference was held in Geneva in 1982. For an
overview of the sessions in light of developing country concerns, see Hans Peter
Kunz-Hallstein, The Revision of the InternationalSystem of Patent Protection In the
Interest of Developing Countries, 10 INT'L REv. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIoHT L. 649
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Paris Convention, while those who did join often used procedural

mechanisms27 to avoid implementing terms of the Paris Convention
deemed unsuitable or unfavorable to their needs and interests.
Thus, developing countries were able to impose restrictions and
28
conditions on patent rights during the pre-TRIPs Agreement era.
This has been severely limited, if not wholly prohibited, under the
29
TRIPs Agreement.
Several areas may be isolated as being of critical importance to
the interests of developing countries in the international patent
system prior to the conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement. The issues
primarily relate to the subject matter of patent protection, the
working of patents, the protection for process patents, and the
availability of compulsory licenses. The underlying concern in all of
these areas is a determined effort on the part of developing countries
that access to technology be a viable prospect for domestic business.
Recently, issues have also arisen regarding the protection of
traditional medicinal knowledge, biotechnology, and seed varieties.
Close examination of this new group of issues discloses what is at the
heart of the conflict between developing and developed countries;
namely, a conflict of ideologies over what constitutes proper subjects
of property rights. This conflict is reinforced on the part of developing
countries by a deep distrust of policies and programs initiated at the
behest of Western nations, even if they purport to enhance global
The TRIPs Agreement, like its predecessor the Paris
welfare.
Convention, softens the edge of its overall purpose by recognizing
some limitations on patent rights in the interests of public health,
nutrition, and development. This section examines the pre-TRIPs
Agreement situation, and the effect of the TRIPs Agreement on these
concerns.

(1979) (concluding that attempts to weaken the international system undermine
rather than facilitate development objectives for developing countries). For a
contrary opinion, see A. Samuel Oddi. The InternationalPatentSystem and Third
World Development. Reality or Myth. 1987 DuKE L.J. 831.
The most prominent examples of such mechanisms are reservations to
27.

specific clauses of the Convention. A reservation is an international law concept
defined as a "unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State,
when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty, whereby it
purports to exclude or to vary the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State." See Louis HENKIN ET AL.. INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES
AND MATERIALS 444-45 (3d ed. 1993).
For a good overview of some of these restrictions in various developing
28.
countries, see Alan S. Gutterman. The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection
of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 89. 93-94 (patents), 96-97
(copyrights) (1993).
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 27-28 (providing for scope of
29.
patentable subject matter and rights conferred).
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A. The Nature and Scope of PatentProtectionWith Regard to
Subject Matter and Conditionsfor Protection

Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, several countries excluded certain
subjects from the purview of patent protection.
Such objects
typically included chemicals, inventions in agriculture and
horticulture, plants, animals, or medical diagnostics. 30 The principle
of national treatment under the Paris Convention3 ' extended the low
terms of patent protection afforded local patentees to foreign patent
applicants. This often ensured that domestic industries had greater
access to technology embodied in the invention-for example,
through compulsory licensing or requirements that the product be
worked locally.
All of this is not to say, however, that developing countries
simply exploited the weaknesses of the international system by
32
taking advantage of foreign patentees. Refusal to patent inventions
in certain areas was also common to developed countries. Prior to
the Paris Convention, for example, Spain and Bolivia did not grant
patents for inventions unless such inventions, in addition to being
new, also established a new industry in the country. Similarly,
Germany did not grant patents for chemical products; France did not
grant patents for non-medical pharmaceutical compositions; and
Austria did not grant patents for food products.3 3 These decisions
often reflected ethical, political, and economic concerns at the
national level. This is also the case with regard to developing
countries' intellectual property laws.3 4 Low standards of patent
protection in countries such as India and Brazil, for example,
facilitated the development of industries, particularly in the
35
pharmaceutical field.
For example, a National Working Group on

30.
See
4th ed. 1996).

PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE

WORLD

N-40, 1-6, C-20 (Alan Jacobs ed.,

31.
See Paris Convention, supra note 25, art. 2.
32.
Developed country literature typically implies that this was the case.
See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 28, at 89: Willard A. Stanback, Note,
International Intellectual Property Protection: An Integrated Solution to the
Inadequate Protection Problem, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 517, 522 (1989).

While this is

certainly the case in some countries, this position does not reflect the entire
circumstances surrounding low patent protection in all developing countries.
33.
See 1 STEPHEN P. LADAs, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS,
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 22 (1975).

34.
See Anil K. Gupta, Debate on Biotechnology and Intellectual Property
Rights: Protecting the Interests of Third World Farmers and Scientists, Paper
Presented at the National Seminar on Commercialization of Biotechnologies,
Biotech Consortium, New Dehll (1992).
35.
Patent protection for pharmaceuticals has proved to be the most
contentious point in international patent relations between developed and
developing countries. A study by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
reports unauthorized sales in 1984 of U.S. pharmaceuticals in five developing
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Patent Laws established by the Indian Government in 1988 argued
that the then-current state of Indian patent law, which excluded

patents for biotechnological products and plant varieties, "has served

Indian interests well.' 6 Developing countries' refusal to adhere to
higher standards for patent protection cannot therefore, as is often
the case, simply be explained as "ignorant," "backward," or conscious
decisions to exploit the system. Rather, refusals often represented
conscious policies to use the system to serve national interests,
however those interests may have been defined. This is a natural use
of the patent system, which like other categories of intellectual
property, has historically served as a means to accomplish national
welfare objectives.
At first glance, the TRIPs Agreement seems to rely substantially
Indeed, some scholars have concluded
on the Paris Convention.3
that the two agreements may successfully, if not happily, coexist. 9
Closer examination, however, shows that the Paris Convention simply
provides a context for the TRIPs Agreement and not a standard. The
Agreement, in reality, derogates from the effects of the Paris
Convention, which left great scope for governmental initiative and
adaptation of the patent grant, a situation which was never
acceptable to developed countries. The first point in this regard is
the extent to which the Paris Convention relies on domestic law.4 °

countries as $192 million, as opposed to genuine sales which amounted to $162
million. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The
Needfor Improved PatentProtection World Wide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 309 (1987).
36.
Gupta, supra note 34, at 10 (noting the fear by Third World farmers of
the impact of patenting biotechnological processes and products on Third World
agriculture). The author also notes that government agencies such as the Dehli
Chamber of Commerce, and interest groups, such as the Indian Drug
Manufacture Association, urged the government not to change the patent law as it
served national interests well.
37.
See, e.g., Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 329 (1858) ("Whilst
the remuneration of genius and useful ingenuity is a duty incumbent upon the
public, the rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and
effectually guarded. Considerations of individual emolument can never be
permitted to operate to the injury of these.").
See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (requiring members
38.
to comply with Paris Convention Articles 1-12 and 19).
See Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The U.S. Proposal for a GATT39.
Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, In GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 11 STUDIES IN INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 75
(Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989).
40.
See Paris Convention, supra note 25, art. 2:
2.

Under the Patents of invention are included the various classes
of industrial patents granted by the laws of the contracting
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Under the Paris Convention, domestic law determined, to a large
extent, the subject matter of patent protection.4 ' It did not, however,

specify how this protection was to be effected.

42

Article I of the

Convention simply established a floor of protection which was limited
to patents without further qualification. The TRIPs Agreement,
although importing Article 1 into its text," states as terms for a
patent grant that it must be "new, [it must] involve an inventive step,
and [it must be] capable of industrial application."" This phrase Is
an outright replica of European conditions for a patent grant.4
Within the TRIPs Agreement context, the terminology is synonymous
with the requirements for "non-obviousness" and "utility" under U.S.
patent law. 46
This deceptively simple terminology will prove difficult for most
developing countries, not only for the obvious reason that they are

States, such as
improvements, etc.

patents

of

importation,

patents

of

But see TRIPs Agreement. supra note 1, art. 1:
1.

The words Industrial Property are to be understood in their
widest acceptation, in the sense that they apply not only to the
productions of industry properly so called, but equally to the
productions of agriculture (wines, grains, fruits, cattle, etc.) and
to mineral productions used in commerce (mineral waters, etc.).

41.
The definition of industrial property under the Paris Convention was
introduced at the Revision Conference of the Hague in 1925. The Convention,
however, did not define what a patent is. As such, member countries were free to
define for themselves the subject matter to which a patent would apply. See
G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (As REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967) 21 (1968).

42.

To the contrary, the Revision Conference at the Hague "expressly

stated that the enumeration of industrial property rights would not oblige the
member states to legislate on all the specific rights enumerated." Id. at 24.
Further, there was no obligation under the Paris Convention for member
countries to grant patents for the subjects listed in Article 1. The list was
illustrative and not definitive. Id. at 24-25.
43.
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.
44.

Id. art. 27.

45.

See, e.g., German Patent Act of December 16, 1980, pt. 1 § 1,

(amended Dec. 9. 1986). reproduced in BEIER ET AL., GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY,
COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAWS, 6 STUDIES IN INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 19 (2d

ed. 1989); see also United Kingdom Patent Act, 1977, art. 1(1) (using terms
identical to those in the German law); see generally GERALD PATERSON, THE
EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM:
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT
CONVENTION (1992).

46.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1994); see also TRIPs Agreement, supra
note 1. art. 27 n.5 (stating the terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial
application" may be synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and "useful"

respectively).
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new standards to which they must conform, but also because there
exists no judicial or administrative history to provide content to these
terms.4 7 An overview of patent law decisions in U. S. courts, for
example, reveals that behind the innocuous word "new" lies a
complex application of rules to determine who was first to invent a
specific device and what was the state of "prior-art" in the field.
"Non-obviousness, '' 48 on the other hand, refers to a requirement that
the invention be non-trivial.4 9 These requirements invoke a body of
jurisprudence which has been carefully developed and applied by
courts in developed countries for years. In contrast, patent systems
in developing countries have had very little judicial involvement in
the creation or maintenance of the rudimentary bodies of law which
regulate their domestic patent systems. Indeed, in most developing
countries, patent law, as with most other categories of intellectual
property laws, are primarily statutory. In other words, they represent
the results of developing countries' accession to international
agreements, rather than the working out of ideals about the patent
system emanating from the individual countries themselves. How
will the rights protected under the TRIPs Agreement translate into
meaningful legal concepts in developing countries? Are developing
countries expected to look to developed countries for the content of
these terms, as well as apply the same body of jurisprudence? The
following hypothetical questions serve to highlight certain problems
this situation portends.
The TRIPs Agreement requires that an invention be "new." May
a national court in a developing country refuse to enforce a patent for
a particular drug for malaria, holding that it is not "new," since
traditional native doctors have historically used the components of

the drug in more rudimentary forms prior to its "discovery" by a
modem patentee?50

47.

A developing country patentee attempting to

The mere fact that these standards areforeignalso portends difficulty.

As mentioned in a later section of the paper, some of these concepts will prove
incompatible with existing social and legal norms in these countries. The greatest
fallacy of international intellectual property protection is the assumption, which
permeates all of the major treaties, that developing countries have little or no
norms with regard to the protection of intangible goods. If this were so, creating a
global model, as the TRIPs Agreement has done, would simply be a matter of
introducing "new" concepts. It is, however, not realistic to presuppose that
superimposing a new and foreign model on preexisting local norms which
regulate the same subject matter will take place easily, if at all.
48.
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
49.
For a seminal case on the American exposition of nonobviousness, see
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
50.
See Steven R. King, The Source of Our Cures, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q.,
Summer 1991, at 19, 19 (noting that the antimalarial drug known as quinine was
first used by Native Americans. The author also notes several other modem cures
which were "known" in the patent sense in areas of the Third World.).
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patent traditional medicine in the United States could be faced with
the invocation of a statutory bar under Section 102(b) of the Patent
Act for public use of the product."' Developed countries are likely to
treat such traditional medicines or cultural knowledge as a product
of nature or decide that they do not satisfy novelty requirements.52 It

is possible, however, that a pharmaceutical company could take the
raw formula or components of a native medicine and work on it until
it satisfies the patentability requirements. 3
Continuing along the same vein, may a developing country
patent an invention that fulfills the requirement of "nonobviousness," assuming all other conditions are present, even though
it may be a trivial invention? 54 Yet another related question under
the TRIPs Agreement: whether the "novelty" requirement is an
absolute novelty requirement or a modified novelty requirement?
Obviously, low level inventions are an important stimulus for local
inventiveness in developing countries. A construction of Article 27
which permits developing countries to recognize inventions, even
where the level of inventiveness is not as high as what obtains in
developed countries, is important for development goals. Stimulation
of local inventiveness is even more crucial in a post TRIPs Agreement
era; developing countries cannot afford, nor should they aspire, to
piggyback on western technology as a primary means of achieving a
strong technology base. The limited success of this strategy was
clearly manifest in the pre-TRIPs Agreement era, and the TRIPs
Agreement is specifically targeted at measures which dilute the
strength of the patentee's monopoly. Adjusting novelty standards is
feasible since there is no universal rule for novelty. 55 It is currently

51.

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).

52.
See Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (A 2,000 year old Chinese text which discussed medicinal uses of saltpeter
was cited against a U.S. invention which used potassium nitrate in toothpaste.);
Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882-84 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)
(No. 9. 856) (holding the new use of ether for anesthesia was unpatentable).
53.
Recently, a U.S. company, W. R. Grace & Co., patented a pesticide
made from Indian neem seeds. The pesticide is based on an extraction process
widely known to Indian farmers. The company discovered a way to treat the
traditional extract in a way that significantly increases its shelf life, thus meeting
the standards for patentability under U.S. law. It is unlikely that any indigenous
Indian farmer opposed the patent under the procedures available under U.S. law.
However, a U.S. based group representing a coalition of critics described the
patent as an example of "genetic colonialism" and filed a petition to have the
patent revoked. See Seeds of Conflict, TIME MAG., Sept. 25, 1995, at 67.
54.
Trivial inventions are currently not patentable in Europe or in the
United States. The "inventive step" and "non-obviousness" requirements have
been construed to require a significant advance in a given field. These are
primarily judicial interpretations of the statutory terms. As such, they have little
weight in developing countries even under the auspices of the TRIPs Agreement.
55.

See HAROLD WEGNER. PATENT HARMONIZATION-BY TREATY OR DOMESTIC

REFORM (1993).
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unclear, however, whether developing countries may amend their
5 6
laws to provide protection for non-absolute novelty inventions.
There is also the concern that under the national treatment rule, a
lower standard of inventiveness would also apply to foreign
inventions, giving an advantage to foreigners to hold a monopoly in
the domestic market. This concern may not be as serious if one
considers the relatively high transaction costs for a foreign investor to
develop an obvious invention since the product would not be
patentable in most developed countries. The developing country
could assess fees and other ancillary costs to discourage foreign
investors from embarking on trivial innovations. The important issue
is to stimulate local inventiveness; the suggestion simply is that a
lower level of innovation may contribute to wide scale indigenous
creative activity.
Western requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness should be adjusted by developing countries to
facilitate domestic innovation.
The requirement that an invention be "new" without further
clarification is also sure to prove controversial for developing
countries5 7 in the area of biotechnology.
The use of cultural
knowledge to facilitate the innovative process58 has recently been
widely documented.5 9 For example, the most effective treatment for
post-therapeutic neuralgia is hot pepper; 6° the cream capsaicin was

56.
See, e.g., James 0. Odek, The Kenya Patent Law: Promoting Local
Inventiveness or Protecting Foreign Patentees?, 38 J. AFR. L. 79, 96-101 (1994)
(concluding that Kenya as a WTO member must amend its patent laws to conform
to the requirements of the TRIPs Agreement, but that it impedes national ability
to facilitate local inventiveness through several provisions such as the novelty
requirement).
57.
Some U.S. scholars have also questioned the efficacy of the
nonobviousness standard for promoting creativity. See generally, A. Samuel
Oddi, Beyond Obviousness:Invention Protection In the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM.
U. L. REV. 1097 (1989) (suggesting that the modem utility patent may not provide
the conditions conducive for sustained creativity in the future); Robert P. Merges,
Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1993)
(discussing the relationship between patent standards and the economic incentive
to develop technology).
58.
In another work, this author has suggested that the time is coming, or
indeed is now, when a distinction must be drawn between "innovation" and
.creation" for the purposes of effectuating contemporary features of intellectual
property protection. Innovation is used loosely to refer to the process by which the
results of creativity is exploited in a free market state. See R. L. Gana, Has
Creativity Died in The Third World? Some Implications of the Internationalization
of Intellectual Property, Paper Presented at the Annual Law and Society Meeting
(June 1-4, 1995).
59.
See, e.g., Christopher Joyce, Prospectorsfor Tropical Medicines, NEw
SCIENTIST, Oct. 1991, at 36.
60.
See William A. Check, Hot Pepper as Medicine: Modern Science Makes
Use of an Ancient PainReliever, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1989, at B3.
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developed as a result of observations of the use of hot pepper by

South American indigenous tribes.61

Pilocarpine, used to treat

glaucoma, was first utilized by indigenous peoples in Brazil. 62 Dtubocurarine, a skeletal muscle relaxant used in anesthesiology, was
derived from, a concoction of arrow poison used by Amazonlan

Indians.63 The TRIPs Agreement neither grants rights to reflect these
forms of contribution to inventiveness, nor does it provide a
framework for the allocation of rights between indigenous knowledge
and the use of this knowledge to develop drugs which are patented
under modem patent laws. Ironically, if one were to strictly construe
"new," particularly with regard to the developed country application
of the standard under domestic 64patent laws, such a patent should
not be issued for want of novelty.
The TRIPs Agreement significantly extends the scope of patent
protection. Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement provides patent
protection for processes and requires that patents be available "in all
fields of technology," ostensibly including biotechnology. This scope
of protection was formerly not granted under domestic patent laws of

61.
Id.
62.
See King, supra note 50, at 19.
63.
Id.
64.
In developed countries, there may also be a question as to whether the
use of raw plants, even in some combination, would not be considered a product
of nature. Section 102 of the U.S. Patent Act requires that an invention be novel.
To satisfy this requirement, an invention must not have been known or used in
the United States, or described in a printed publication in the United States or a
foreign country before the invention of it by the patent applicant. See In re Hall,
781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). While traditional medicinal knowledge may fall outside the terms of
the U.S. novelty requirement (since it usually is not published or used in the U.S.)
it nonetheless will present difficulty if a developing country refuses to recognize
such an invention on the grounds that it Is not "new." One question is whether
traditional knowledge and use, not documented, constitutes some form of prior
art. Another, more serious question is how to adequately recognize the
innovation that goes into making the "known" product or process marketable
internationally. Clearly, indigenous experts cannot explain in chemical (and thus
commercially reproducible) terms that in the plant or mix of plants causes the
cure of illness. For example, Andean Indians used the plant chinchona as a
prophylactic for malaria and introduced it, via the Jesuits, to the rest of the world.
French scientist Pierre-Joseph Pelletier discovered in 1820 that chinchona
worked because of quinine, a chemical component in the plant. See generally
DANIEL R. HEADRICK, THE TooLs OF EMPIRE:
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 65-66 (1981).

TECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN IMPERALISM
Under the rules of the patent system

today, the patent belongs to Pelletier. How does this promote or encourage
invocation among Andean Indians? What kind of reward, if any, should they
receive for their knowledge?
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several developing66countries, 65 and arguably, was not required by the
Paris Convention.
Developing countries have been extremely concerned about the
impact of patenting biotechnological processes and products. These

concerns range from ethical issues, e.g., should plant life be
patented, to legal issues, e.g., are they "new," to economic issues,
e.g., how are rights to be allocated between farmers in developing
countries and patentholders who usually are multinational

corporations.
Ethical and developmental issues also permeated
developing countries' concerns over extending patents to
pharmaceuticals and chemical products. 68 The TRIPs Agreement
overrides these concerns by granting transitional arrangements to
developing countries.69 The success of the TRIPs Agreement in this
area, at least for enforcement purposes, is dependent on the extent to
which individual countries can, within this time period, transform
the legal and social barriers to patentability in certain areas. 70 For
some countries, this may implicate national constitutional
prerogatives which regulate issues of public morals r ' and which
determine what may properly be designated as the subject of private
ownership.7 2
The TRIPs Agreement has enhanced the possibility of
dissemination of technological information by requiring that a patent
application sufficiently disclose the invention which is the subject of

65.
See, e.g., USTR Releases Annual Trade Report on RestrictionsAround the
World, 5 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 121 (1991) [hereinafter USTR Report]
(process patents were not protected in Brazil or Argentina).
66.
See Gupta, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
67.
For an overview of Third World concerns and some suggestions about
the allocation of rights, see Gupta, supra note 34.
68.
Notably, India, Brazil and Argentina were cited by the U.S. Trade
Representative as having inadequate patent protection for pharmaceutical
products and processes, as well as chemical products. See USTR Report, supra
note 65, at 7-9, 19-24, 113-21 (respectively discussing Argentina, Brazil, and
India).
69.
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 65(2), 66.
70.
The TRIPs Agreement expands the scope of patentable subject matter
so that WTO members are required to protect plant varieties and other
agricultural products. See generally TRIPs AGREEMENT, supranote 1, art. 27.
71.
This concern is shared to some respect in Europe, for example in the
debates regarding the patenting of life. See generally, D. MacKenzie, Europe
Debates the Ownership of Life, 133 NEW SCIENTIST 9 (1992); Angus J. Wells,
Patenting New Life Forms:An Ecological Perspective, 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 111
(1994).
72.
See David Hurlbut, Fixing the Blodiversity Convention: Toward a Special
ProtocolforRelated Intellectual Property, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 382-90 (1994)
(noting that different cultures do not define property and private ownership in the
same manner).
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the application. 3 The application must describe the invention in
enough detail that a person skilled in the art may carry out the
invention from the information disclosed. 4
Since increased

dissemination of technical information was a prime issue in
developing countries' interests in reforming the international patent

system, this result under TRIPs Agreement is welcome.

It Is,

however, only theoretically so.
The thrust of the international patent system is that the award

of a monopoly grant within the system gives the patentee the
exclusive right to make, use, offer for sale, sell, or import the
product.7 5 Thus, while the information may be disseminated, the
ability to utilize the invention for domestic purposes or to adapt the
invention to suit peculiarities in other countries is still not legally
76
available. Indeed, the more that information is disclosed in a patent
application in developing countries, the greater the scope of a foreign
patentee's control over similar inventions or improvements to the
invention patented.77 Developing countries may alleviate this effect
by enacting stringent "claims" requirements in their domestic
legislation. 8 Claims represent the heart of a patent grant in the
sense that they determine the external boundaries of the invention
that the patent covers. The more narrowly a claim is required to be
drawn, the more narrow the scope of the property right granted by
the patent. Additionally, since there is no agreement on the doctrine
of equivalents, courts in developing countries may encourage local
adaptations of the patented product. 9

73.
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1. art. 29.
74.
Id.
75.
See Id. art. 28(1](a).
76.
As one developing country scholar points out, patent systems in
developing countries have tended to have no benefits for the countries, but rather
"restrict[I their technological advance through initiation and adaptation." C.
VAITSOS, THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A THIRD

WORLD POSITION (1976); see also C.V. Vaitsos, Patents Revisited: Their Function In
Developing Countries, J. DEy. STUD., Oct., 1972.
77.
The doctrine of equivalents prevents the award of a patent grant to an
inventor of a product which does the same or the equivalent function that is
covered by a prior patent.
78.
There are of course other doctrines on which developing countries
could capitalize by implementing or, conversely, refusing to implement, in local
patent legislation. For example, the doctrine of equivalents in U.S. law may be
invoked by a patentee to prevent the grant of a patent for an invention which
"doles] the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplishles)
substantially the same result ... ." Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1877); see also Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853) (seminal case).
79.
Relchman, supra note 4,at 6. Literal infringement falls within Article
28 of the TRIPs Agreement. Developing countries' courts and administrative
bodies must be careful to remain within the narrow space between literal
infringement and equivalents.
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Another concern for developing countries under the TRIPs
Agreement is the extension of the period of protection to twenty
years. 80 This prolongs the period of monopoly with a severely limited
right of adaptation, effectively sealing off the opportunity to reap fully
the benefits of having granted a patent to a foreign applicant. If the
use of information obtained from a patent application is so severely
curtailed, what is the practical benefit of the knowledge to the
developing country? Even under a system of compulsory licensing, a
developing country, by being prohibited from recognizing independent
creations of a similar invention, 8' may continue to pay more than the
market value of a technology that is outdated. 2 One scholar aptly
points out:
It is true that one does not have to re-invent the wheel in order to
ride a bicycle. It is true that each country that undertakes the
modernization of its economy relies partly on the heritage of others
....
[Tlechnology is being bought and sold like a commodity but
there is no world market, nor world exchanges for technology. The
"late-comers" (developing countries) in this case are like spectators
arriving at the last moment at a cup finale
and having to buy
83
tickets from vendors at an excessive price.

Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPs Agreement foresee limited
exceptions to the rights conferred by a patent grant. Article 30
provides a general exception to the exclusive rights afforded a

patentee. On the other hand, Article 31 allows for "other use" of a
subject matter of a patent grant, but imposes a long list of terms
which describe certain uses deemed legitimate under the TRIPs
Agreement. It is not yet clear how these two provisions fit together.
The two Articles, however, determine the outer limits of the scope of
initiative that developing countries may legitimately rely upon when
pursuing national objectives. The need to provide pharmaceuticals
and other medicinal goods or to combat shortages arising from
outbreaks of disease or other national emergencies would clearly fall
under these provisions.
In addition, the availability of
pharmaceutical goods at a rate which makes such goods available in
real, i.e., affordable, terms to the population of a developing country
should constitute a valid ground for invoking the exceptions afforded
under the TRIPs Agreement.

80.
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1. art. 33.
81.
If the interpretation of the term "new" is drawn from a U.S. or
European patent jurisprudence, this would be the effect of this provision under,
for example, the doctrine of equivalents.
82.
See D. GOULET. THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE: VALUE CONFLICTS IN
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 34 (1977) (quoting Lord Ritchie Calder).
83.
Id.
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The bite of Article 31 appears to be the curtailment of working
requirements which, in the opinion of developed countries,
undermine a patentee's rights. The TRIPs Agreement eliminates the
use of working requirements as a condition to granting a patent.84 By
virtue of Article 29, the only conditions on patent applications are:
(1) sufficient
disclosure, and (2) information
concerning
8
corresponding foreign applications. 5 Extreme working requirements
undermine the degree of profit available to a patentee. Developing
countries must use initiative to ameliorate the effects of this provision
in the course of devising domestic legislation, either in the patent
field or in a related area of regulation, such as competition law or
technology transfer policies.
The combination of limitations to a patentholder's rights reflects
much of what was recognized by the Paris Convention. The challenge
still remains whether it is possible to assimilate concerns about
economic development in a manner that is consistent with exclusive
monopoly rights in technology products.
The history of the
international patent system suggests not, and the TRIPs Agreement,
which cuts back even more on traditional strategies such as
compulsory licensing and eliminates local working requirements,
suggests more strongly than ever that development strategies which

have their main focus on the acquisition of technology from developed
countries must be re-examined within a broader policy of economic
and political reform.
B. Domestic PatentProtection
The singular weakness of the pre-TRIPs Agreement international
protection of intellectual property was its heavy dependence on
protection afforded by national legislation.
The result of this
dependence, as was borne out by the failed revision attempts, was a
disparity over certain fundamental features of the patent grant. As
mentioned earlier, however, such disparities served to facilitate
access to technology by developing countries. At the same time, the
dependence on national laws reserved to countries the possibility and
right to tailor the patent system to their respective benefits. The
TRIPs Agreement overtly limits this possibility and, at the same time,
significantly encroaches on the ability of developing countries to
access technology. For example, the combined effect of Article 5A
and 5quater of the Paris Convention is a restriction of the scope of a
country's ability to diminish the economic value of a patent. Article
5A provides protection against national working requirements,

84.

The Philippines and Argentina, for example, had stringent working

requirements which, if not met, would lead to the lapse of the patent.

85.

See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 29.

1996]

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER THE TRIPs AGREEMENT

compulsory licenses, and patent forfeiture. Article 5quater, on the
other hand, provides minimal protection against infringement of a
process patent with regards to the importation of products
manufactured abroad by that patented process. There is very little
room to circumvent these provisions under the TRIPs Agreement. To
the extent that compliance has a perceptible deleterious effect on a
developing country, however, it is possible to envision the use of
other bodies of law or invocation of one of the exceptions recognized
by the TRIPs Agreement, such as Article 40 in the case of anticompetitive practices or Article 31 to limit such effects.
The function of the TRIPs Agreement is not to create a worldwide agreement on patent laws. However, there is a significant
problem created by importing domestic requirements in developed
countries into the Agreement and purporting that these requirements
somehow translate into meaningful standards for developing
countries. It is unrealistic to think that developing countries will
learn the entire patent systems of developed countries in order to
apply the TRIPs Agreement. They should, however, learn enough to
enable them to use and adapt the patent system for identifiable
development purposes.
It is possible, for example, under the TRIPs Agreement for
developing countries to define the content of the standards imposed
by the TRIPs Agreement. The singular requirement of international
law is that this must be done in good faith. 86 Developing countries
should utilize this opportunity to tailor domestic legislation in a way
that promotes local inventiveness by, for example, permitting lower
standards of inventiveness, preventing broad claims, avoiding

elements such as the equivalence doctrine, protecting improvements
as separate inventions, and employing a liberal test for
Clearly, these suggestions have their own
nonobviousness.
limitations, particularly the implications that arise under the
What is important is that developing
national treatment rule.
countries provide content to domestic legislation in a way that clearly
benefits their immediate societies. Some scholars have suggested
alternative proprietary regimes, such as utility models, patents of
Utility models are low level
introduction, and other hybrid regimes.
improvements on existing functional products. While they have been
used successfully in countries like China to encourage domestic
innovation and are widely praised for their success in encouraging

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
86.
23, 1969, art. 26, S. TREATY Doc. No. 92-1, 8 I.L.M. 679 (under the principle of
pacta sunct servanda).
For a discussion of these, see Relchman, supra note 4, at 38-40.
87.
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adaptation and improvement of foreign inventions,88 it is also true
that no country has made significant progress in technological
advancement through a regime of utility models. Indeed, in many
rural areas of developing countries, these improvements take place
without the incentive of a proprietary regime. Finally, it is certainly
only a question of time before utility models and the patent regime
conflict, particularly where developing countries attempt to work
around foreign patents. This is sure to elicit claims of TRIPs
Agreement violation. One scholar has already observed how "[olver
time, utility model laws thus degenerated into longer and stronger
petty patent regimes devoted to small inventions generally, which
contradicts the economic and policy rationales that justify the patent
monopoly."s One can be sure that it will only be a matter of time
before developed countries object to utility models, should they focus
merely on improvements to foreign patented products.
The same
concern may be expressed over patents of introduction which operate
to encourage commercialization of foreign technologies that have not
yet been protected under domestic patent law. These "patents" are
given to individuals who work the patent in the domestic country.
They are likely to run afoul of the TRIPs Agreement more quickly than
utility models-unless the patentee fails to fie a timely application in
the developing country-since the TRIPs Agreement eliminates the
prospect of linking protection to working requirements. Alternative
regimes, for the most part, do not represent significant opportunities

for

developing

countries

where

technology

acquisition and

development is concerned. The international patent system Is based
on a highly sophisticated, deliberate set of rules which have
successfully captured the main avenues of transborder technology
flows; it is not a system designed to encourage and facilitate the
success of other regimes. Nonetheless, these alternative regimes offer
developing countries a range of possibilities which each country may
combine in different ways to pursue technological advancement and
larger development goals.
In the short term, the regimes are
particularly attractive because they are not addressed under the
TRIPs Agreement and are probably of limited interest to foreigners.
The critical feature of the TRIPs Agreement for developing
countries is the extent to which the Agreement facilitates accessibility
to technology and the costs of that technology as a function of the
degree of control granted to a patentee in the international context.
This situation presents a double-edged sword to developing
countries. Developing countries stand to gain under the current
patent systems of developed countries in the area of biotechnology

88.
89.

See Id. at 39.
Id.
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and the use of indigenous knowledge to develop new drugs. 90 It will,
however, be difficult for developing countries to secure absolute gains
from this because they cannot single-handedly operate within the
current patent system. The patent application process in most
developed countries is typically financially prohibitive. In addition,
the amount and complexity of information about legal requirements
an applicant is required to master in order to obtain a patent will
prove a significant hurdle for developing country applicants. 9 The
Least Developing Countries, as well as some developing countries,
and certainly their citizens cannot afford to go through this process.
The key policy concern under the TRIPs Agreement, then, is how to
draw a balance between maximum gains of an exclusive international
right and minimum requirements that patent protection in a
developing country should confer some meaningful benefit to that
country.

Ill. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND COPYRIGHT PROTECTION UNDER THE
TRJPS AGREEMENT

The impetus behind the TRIPs Agreement is a combination of
two inextricable objectives: (1) to secure global economic rewards of
an intellectual property grant, and (2) to facilitate the enforcement of
these rights as a means to accomplish the first objective. By
situating the TRIPs Agreement in the framework of multilateral trade
relations, the Agreement benefits from the increased incentive for
nations to enforce intellectual property rights through the threat of

trade sanctions.

92

Like a wheel, the TRIPs Agreement envisages that

the threat of trade sanctions will propel the forward motion of respect
and protection of copyrights worldwide. Is this a realistic proposition
in the case of developing countries? Several issues intrinsic to the

90.
See Id. at 9 (describing cooperative efforts to promote research in
biotechnology behveen some Latin American countries and the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)).
Again,
91.
Obviously, this is where patent attorneys are required.
however, the cost of legal fees often proves prohibitive for these countries and
their citizens.
92.
As part of the GATT, violation of the TRIPs Agreement gives rise to the
legitimate use of trade sanctions against the Contracting Party. While the TRIPs
Agreement provides for dispute prevention and settlement, under the general
framework of GATT a Contracting Party, after failure to resolve a dispute, may
invoke trade sanctions against another Contracting Party who has acted
inconsistently Nvith its GATT obligations. See generally Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1, art. XXIII
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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TRIPs agreement in particular, and to the WTO structure as a whole,
suggest not.
A. The Carry Over of Pre-TRIPsAgreement Concerns
The shortcomings of the pre-TRIPs Agreement international
copyright system remain a continued and aggravated feature of the
TRIPs Agreement. After the defeat of the Stockholm Protocol to the
Berne Convention, 93 developing countries remained relatively inactive
in international copyright relations. Yet, concerns over literacy and
education remain a salient feature of domestic policy, as reflected in
national copyright laws.
The natural corollary to the grant of an exclusive right is a level
of absolute control over the use and availability of the protected work.
To this extent, all the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement implicate
developing country concerns over availability and cost of the
protected work. A few examples will, however, serve to amplify these
concerns.
Under the provisions for copyright and related rights,94 the
TRIPS Agreement allows for limitations or exceptions to exclusive
rights "in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder." 95 This same exception
extends to all rights covered by the TRIPs Agreement, not just the
reproductive right. The terms "normal exploitation" and "legitimate
interests" are, however, no more clearer under the TRIPs Agreement
than they have been within the Berne Convention which utilizes the
96
same language.
Historical notes on the interpretation of Article 9(2)
of the Berne Convention suggest that conflict with "normal

93.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]. The Stockholm Protocol attempted to grant significant concessions
to developing countries In response to their expressed concerns about the need to
foster development and the costs and difficulties associated with obtaining
copyrighted works through licensing agreements or outright sales of the work.

The Protocol responded to these concerns by allowing developing countries to
derogate from obligations under the Berne Convention, such as restrictions on
authors' rights for educational purposes, termination of translation rights when
these rights are not exercised within a specific time period, and the provision of
compulsory licenses. For a history of events leading to the creation of the
Protocol, and those leading to its defeat, see SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKs:
1886-1987,
598-662 (1987).
94.
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 9-14.
95.
See Id. art. 13.
96.
See Berne Convention, supra note 93, art. 9(2); see also RICKETSON,
supra note 92, at 370 (noting the scope and content of the reproduction right was
problematic from the very beginning).
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exploitation" refers to such things as massive amounts of
photocopying, particularly where it is done for industrial or economic
gain.97 Ultimately, however, the precise determination of what is
normal is left up to independent countries. 98
The more problematic phrase is "legitimate interests." What
constitutes a "legitimate interest" of a rights holder is dependent on
the particular vision of copyright a country employs. Thus, in
continental countries, a moral right is certainly considered "a
legitimate interest" of the author, while this is not the case in most
common law jurisdictions. Moral rights are excluded under the
TRIPs Agreement; however, it may be argued that a country has the
freedom under the TRIPs Agreement to determine its own copyright
philosophy, and thus, to define the scope of the phrase "legitimate
interests." The judiciary of such a country would then be free, within
the auspices of the statute, to carve out principles which conform to
the particular copyright philosophy. It is clear that a deliberate
contravention of a TRIPs Agreement provision would not be perceived
as a legitimate attempt to comply with its terms. Again, however, the
determination of what is "legitimate" when conflict arises between
national judicial construction and interpretation of the TRIPs
Agreement is an open-ended matter which depends on the manner in
which individual countries ratify the Agreement and reconcile it with
domestic law.
Under the Berne Convention, one interpretation offered suggests
that exceptions under Article 9(2) could take the form of compulsory
licenses. 99 This interpretation is, however, problematic given the fact
that an Indian proposal for a specific provision permitting
compulsory licensing was rejected.' 0 0 Thus, compulsory licenses,
which have always been of interest to developing countries, may
clearly be deemed as interference with the "normal exploitation" of
the work. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that during the
TRIPs Agreement negotiations, albeit more in the patent context,
developed countries explicitly expressed the view that restrictions of
this sort interfere with the rights holders' exclusivity as guaranteed
under the international agreements. Clearly then, the extensive use
of compulsory licensing is out of the question under the TRIPs
Agreement, except where permitted by the Berne Convention.' 0 ' Even
if a compulsory license does not per se interfere with "normal
exploitation" or "unreasonably prejudice... legitimate interests," its

97.
98.
99.

See RICKETSON, supranote 93, at 482-83.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 484.

100.

Id. at 485.

101.

See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(b).
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use as an instrument to facilitate national development goals would
still be limited to "special cases." Within the Berne Convention, these
"special cases" were deemed to be very rare occasions,10 2 where
national security concerns or other similar exigencies called for
extreme state action. An extremely literal interpretation of the TRIPs
Agreement may suggest that Article 73, which provides for security
exceptions, is the only plausible framework within which to construe
Article 13. It is more likely, however, that the exact scope and
meaning of this provision will remain unclear until dispute resolution
procedures are actually deployed.
One of the concerns expressed historically by developing
countries is the ability to access products from the Western
hemisphere. 0 3 Impediments to this objective are usually the high
cost of obtaining licensing agreements and the restrictions on use
that such agreements entail. Understandably, the TRIPs Agreement
does not address these "impediments," since in developed country
perspectives, these are normal costs associated with copyright
protection. Article 11 of the TRIPs Agreement, which deals with
rental rights, directly implicates these concerns.
Article 11 enlarges the scope of control for a right holder with
respect to computer programs and cinematographic works. The
provision requires members to "provide authors and their successors
in title the right to authorize and prohibit the commercial rental to
04
the public of originals or copies of their copyright works.""'
'Ivo

immediate effects of this provision are important for developing
countries. First, it is possible under this provision to limit the
availability of these products in a national market, should the right
holder so desire. Yet, commercial rental, at least for some developing
countries, is often the only avenue that ensures widespread
dissemination. It is also usually cheaper, in economic terms, to rent
rather than to purchase a work. In this regard, granting the
copyright holder such strong control of how and whether a work is
available in a country cuts directly across the developing country's
desire for access. The second, albeit related, consequence is that the
additional transaction costs which commercial renting requires from
the perspective of the corporation or business which rents the work Is
automatically passed along to the consumers. The time involved in
negotiating permission to rent an author's works and the fees
associated with this negotiation will hinder accessibility to the work
in question.

102. RICKETSON, supra note 93, at 482.
103. For a recent opinion on how accessing knowledge may be resolved In
the context of digital technology, see Simon Olswang, Access rightAn Evolutionary
Pathfor Copyright into the DigitalEra?, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 215 (1995).
104. Id.
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As mentioned earlier, the problem with intellectual goods in
developing countries is typically the cost at which they are made
available to the general public. The control afforded a right holder
under Article 11 effectively means that the costs of the product are
likely to keep it inaccessible to developing country populations. This
accessibility concern is not relieved by the fact that Article 11 allows
exceptions for computer programs when the program itself is not the
essential object of the rental. The exception for cinematographic
works, "unless such rental has led to widespread copying . . .
materially impairing the exclusive right of reproduction," alleviates
this concern only by adding a degree of vagueness to Article 11. The
provision seems to suggest that a determination, presumably by a
TRIPs Agreement panel, that a country utilizing the exception has
violated the terms thereof is the only way for an author to enjoy the
benefits of exclusivity under Article 11. This is unclear from the
terms of the Agreement. The point is, nevertheless, that peripheral
limitations on rights granted to enable greater control of the actual
object of the right will not make access any easier for a developing
country.
The accessibility concern permeates other rights incorporated
into the TRIPs Agreement under Article 2(1). An exaple of this is
the translation right.10 5 Where works are not available in the
dominant linguafranca of a developing country, translation of the
work is essential for accessibility. The Berne Convention Appendix
which allows limited use of a compulsory license for such a purpose
has hardly been relied upon by developing countries. °6 Reasons for
this include the costs associated with licensing and the historical
difficulties associated with the provisions of Article II of the
Appendix.10 7 The wholesale importation of the Appendix into the
TRIPs Agreement, despite its non-use in the past, without addressing
the barriers to its use appears simply to be a form of tokenism with
no genuine possibility of yielding material benefits to developing
countries.
It is also likely to generate hostility to the TRIPs
Agreement at the enforcement level.
Other significant articles for developing country accessibility
concerns are Articles 1 bis and 12 of the Berne Convention. 0 8 These
articles deal with broadcasting and related rights, adaptation rights,
arrangement, and other alteration. Again, the issue for concern
relates to the cost of these goods and the lack of ability to adapt or

105.
106.
107.
108.
See TRIPs

See Berne Convention, supra note 93, art. 8.
See RICKETSON, supra note 93, at 663.
Id.
These Articles are incorporated by reference into the TRIPs Agreement.
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 9.
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use them in a manner which facilitates the need to disseminate
knowledge in forms and through mediums available to developing
countries at their respective stages of development.
B. The Politics of Culture
The idea of intellectual goods as property, and further, the
definition of property as including the right to exclude'0 9 meets with

unprecedented resistance in the attempt to introduce the modem
concept of intellectual property in many Asian and African countries.
While governments in these countries may accede to international
agreements recognizing and protecting intellectual goods, this will
not, as history continues to bear out, translate into a culture which
enforces intellectual property rights as currently envisaged by the
TRIPs Agreement. Despite best efforts, reality suggests that for as
long as there exists direct conflict with strongly held values and
norms within the society, enforcement will be problematic. The
classic case study for this argument is the Peoples Republic of China.
Shortly after the Uruguay Round came into effect, the United
States threatened China with Section 301 action in retaliation for

intellectual property infringement.'

0

The dispute resulted in a

Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries.' China
pledged again to enforce intellectual property rights as well as to set
up another round of administrative mechanisms to accomplish this
goal. 2 Recently, for the first time, a Chinese court sanctioned a local
company for copyright infringement!" 3 But, as some have noted,
these overt actions may be more symbolic than substantive,
particularly
since stealing a book is still considered an elegant
4
offense. "1

The United States-China dispute in this post-TRIPs Agreement
era is a good case study primarily because China seeks admission to
the WTO. More important for enforcement concerns, however, is the

109. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8. 12
(1927) ("The essence of private property Is always the right to exclude.
").
110. See Bob Davis, U.S. to Propose Chinese Trade Sanctions to Curb Pirated
CD, Films, Software, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1994, at A3.
111. See Helene Cooper and Kathy Chen, China Averts Trade War with the
U.S., Promising a Campaign Against Piracy-Accord Also Opens Market to U.S.
Movies, Music and Computer Software, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1995, at A3.
112. Id.
113. See World Pirate SoundcarrlerSales Exceed $2.2bn, FIN. TIMES: MUSIC &
COPYRIGHT, May 24, 1995.

114. Shortly after the dispute was resolved, several scholars noted that it
would be impossible for China to comply with the requirements to stop
infringement. The attempt to reverse 2000 years of Chinese history by decree

simply would not be successful. See Helene Cooper, China's Hurdles to Making
U.S. Accord a Success Spur Worries Among Analysts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995.
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fact that both mainland China and Taiwan are significant sources of
piracy and counterfeit goods. 15 In 1982, 56% of all counterfeit goods
Taiwan. 16
confiscated by the United States reportedly originated in
The figure rose dramatically in 1986.117
Although not a formal GATT member,"8 China has long enjoyed
most-favored-nation" 9 treatment with several countries within the
GATT system, including, most notably, the United States. The first
bilateral agreement on copyright protection between the two
Almost a century later, despite
countries was negotiated in 1903.
the threatened and actual use of trade sanctions, copyright
infringement continues to haunt trade relations between the two
countries; dispute over intellectual property protection in China has

become a fixture of international trade between China and the United
States. The reasons for this phenomena are more deeply embedded
in the social structure of the Chinese society than developed
countries have acknowledged.' 21 In addition, however, the mistaken
premise of negotiations with China and indeed with most other
countries is that these countries lack intellectual property
developing
22
laws.

115. See Roger Skrentney. Fighting a Reputation as the 'CounterfeitCapitalof
Asia'. L.A. DAILY J., May 19, 1986, at 3.
116. Id.
117. Id. The figure this year was 86%.
118. See Bhushan Bahree, China Falls in Bid to Rejoin GATT by Own
Deadline,WALL ST. J. INT'L, Dec. 20, 1994, at AIO.
119. Most-favored-nation (MFN) provisions are the cornerstones of most
international trade and commerce agreements. The MFN clause is regarded as
the central policy of the GATT and is embodied in Article I of the GATT. The
principle is concerned with non-discrimination in international trade and requires
Contracting Parties to the GATT to treat other Contracting Parties the way the
.most favored nation" or "best friend" of that nation is treated. The practical
result of this provision is that a nation like China, which is not a GATT member,
by virtue of a bilateral trade agreement which incorporates an unconditional MFN
clause, is automatically entitled to treatment afforded to a GATT member.
Conversely, if by virtue of a bilateral trade agreement, a GATT member gives
certain benefits to a non-GATT member, other GATT Contracting Parties are
The principle thus eliminates the incidence of
entitled to that same benefit.
favoritism between trading partners. In addition, it promotes efficiency, security,
equality and transparency in international economic relations. See JACKSON ET
AL., supra note 10, at 436-38 (discussing the policies underlying the principle of
the MFN provision).
See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT
120.
LAWS, Bulletin No. 9, at 39 (1905).
121. See William P. Alford, U.S. Takes the Wrong Road in China, CHI. TRIB.,

Feb. 17, 1995, at 23.
122. For a history of intellectual property in China, see WILLIAM P. ALFORD,
To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENCE:
CIVILIZATION (1995).

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE
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A cursory study of indigenous approaches to the protection of
intellectual goods reveals that most cultures recognize the material
value engendered by the results of intellectual labor. The way that
value is protected, however, differs significantly from what modem
categories of intellectual property laws provide. The Invention of
printing came from China in the 6th century, 123 as did the invention
of paper in A.D. 105.124 Yet history records that China did not exploit
these inventions and many others through the intellectual property
system.
Consequently, several Chinese inventions were transferred
to Europe, where the inventions were exploited by way of trade with
1 26
Arabs.
With regard to printing, the sole aim of publishing in China was
to supply a lay readership with knowledge. Knowledge, according to
Confucian thought, cannot be owned or controlled, but rather, must
be duplicated with exactity. 127 While a form of copyright did exist in
imperial China, the purpose of the law was not to protect creativity or
economic interests, but rather, to maintain social order.1 28 As with
the Stationer's copyright in England,129 the use of copyright in
imperial China was to control how and what kind of knowledge was
disseminated to the society. In addition, copyright was used to

prevent dilution of sacred texts; the prohibition of unauthorized
reproduction of literature was primarily to protect the purity
of
30
knowledge, not necessarily the author or the author's "rights."
The Chinese attitude toward the protection of knowledge was
shared to some degree by India in the 11th Century.13 '
The
traditional approach to piracy was not that it was appropriate
morally, but rather, that knowledge and its expression in works of
creativity were like the ocean--"although robbed of its many jewels by
gods, remains even to date a mine of jewels." 32 This attitude seemed
to indicate that while authors were being robbed, they would
nonetheless not be depleted of knowledge goods. It is also interesting

123.

This was in the form of block printing. See 26 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
415 (1994).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See ALFORD, supra note 122, at 25 ("The Master [Confucious] said: I
transmit rather than create.") (quoting from the Analects of Confucious, Book VII,
Chapter 1 (Waley, trans.)).
128. Id. at 11-18.
129. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968).
130. Id. at 11-13.
BRITANNICA

131.

See T.S. Krishnamurti, Copyright-Another View, 15 BULL. COPYRIGHT

SoC'Y U.S-A. 217, 218-20 (1969). For an abstract of Krishnamurti's 1969 lecture,
see 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 252 (1970).

132.

T. S. Krishnamurti, Copyright-Another View, 15 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y

U.S.A. 217, 219 (1969) (quoting the 11th Century poet Bilhann).
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to note that in India, both ideas and expressions were considered the
property of the author. 3 3 Indian society in this era acknowledged
the
34
exceptions.
few
apparently
with
words
of
absolute ownership
It is fair to say, then, with regard to copyright, that traditional
societies often regard copyright as a matter of social cohesion, not
purely or primarily one of economics. 35 In the case of modem China,
this traditional underlay is reinforced by a political structure which
purportedly continues to have low tolerance for individualist capital
accumulation, while also employing state control over the avenues of
commerce.
Since modem intellectual property forms are an
intrinsic part of modem commerce, it is not surprising to find
significant resistance to intellectual property protection in modem
China. While the international intellectual property system may be
indifferent to the validity of traditional models, these models, in part,
explain the approach to piracy and counterfeit goods at the
grassroots levels where this activity takes place. The persistence of
piracy suggests that these traditional systems cannot be overridden
by international treaty fiat. To this extent, they must be addressed

by the intemational system.
An example of rights particularly vulnerable to infringement
under cultural norms would be rights protected under Articles 11,
1 Ibis, or 1iter of the Berne Convention. These articles, respectively,
give authors of literary, artistic, dramatic or dramatic-musical works
exclusive rights to authorize: (1) public performance, 37 broadcasting,
or communication of their work, 38 (2) public recitation of their works,
and (3) communication to the public of a recitation. 39 In several
African countries where public recitation of plays and dramas are a
part of rural village life," 40 could an African country permit the
continuation of this practice without violating the TRIPs Agreement?
This certainly is a plausible argument. The TRIPs Agreement
recognizes limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights it seeks
to enforce. 4 ' While earlier sections of this Article have considered
the possible limits of the scope of these exceptions, it seems clear in

133. Id. at 218-19.
134. Id.
135. See Harlbut, supra note 72, at 382-90.
136. See generally Brian Barron, Chinese Patent Legislation In Cultural and
Historical Perspective, 6 INTELL. PROP. J. 313 (1991) (discussing the influences of
Confucianism and socialism on Chinese patent law).
137. Berne Convention, supra note 93, art. 11.
138. Id. art. 1 ibis.
139. Id. art. 11ter.
140. See KAREN BARBER, THE POPULARARTS INAFRICA 1-10 (1986).
141. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 13 (copyright limitations) &
30 (patent limitations).
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the copyright setting that the common law doctrine of fair use Is
implicated by Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement. 42 If this is so, then
the only real question is whether or not a national court would
determine this type of local use to be fair use.
To extend this argument to a contemporary problem, one should
consider the playing of copyrighted music in the waiting room of a
doctor's office, pub, or other public setting. Such activity was
recently attacked as an infringement of a copyright in the United
States.143 It may be argued, however, that since this activity Is
territorial and arguably not "commercial," it falls outside the auspices
of the TRIPs Agreement, although perhaps not the Berne
Convention. 44 It is clear that a developing country must grant
foreigners the rights prescribed under the TRIPs Agreement through
implementing domestic legislation. 45 This requirement, however,
does not answer the question of whether the TRIPs Agreement has
jurisdiction over all violations of intellectual property rights
regardless of whether such violation is trade-related.

Finally, must a national court first determine, as a matter of
procedure, that an infringement is not trade-related before
proceeding to apply other legal arrangements? Determination of an
answer to this question is dependent on the manner of
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement in various countries. In the
United States, the answer Is certainly in the affirmative. In the
European Union, debate continues over the method by which the
TRIPs Agreement will be applicable to member states. 46 What seems
clear is that the results in this regard are not going to be consistent.
This will affect the substantive jurisdiction of the TRIPs Agreement in
relation to the domestic judicial system of all member countries.
IV. ENFORCEMENT PROSPECTS FOR THE TRIPS AGREEMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The TRIPs Agreement requires that, at a minimum, intellectual
property laws in member countries of the WTO must conform to Its

142. Under the Berne Convention, which uses the same terminology, the
doctrine of fair use was clearly contemplated. See Berne Convention, supra note
93, arts. 9(2) & l0bis; see also RICKETSON, supra note 93, at 477-548.
143. See Stephanie N. Mehta, ASCAP to Sam: Play It Again, but Pay for It,
WALL ST. J.. Sept. 27, 1994, at B1.

144. Assuming the developing country Is a member of the Berne
Convention.
145. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1.
146. For one perspective on this, see Josef Drexl, The TRIPs Agreement and
the EC: What Comes Next After Joint Competence. STUDIES
COPYRIGHT L. (forthcoming 1996).
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terns. 47 What this Article has tried so far to demonstrate is that the
extent of this requirement, and more importantly, the specific content
of this requirement, are unclear. Nonetheless, the probabilities of
success for enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement must be examined
from two perspectives, namely internal and external enforcement.
Internal enforcement deals primarily with the possibility of private
individual action within a developing country under the TRIPs
Agreement. This is directly related to and determined by prevailing
socio-economic and legal conditions in these countries. The prospect
of internal enforcement also depends on the mechanisms used to
implement the TRIPs Agreement in developing countries. External
enforcement, on the other hand, deals with the use of trade sanctions
or the threat of trade sanctions to force compliance with TRIPs
Agreement provisions. The success of this form of enforcement Is
dependent on the legitimacy of the WTO dispute resolution process in
other areas of the Agreement.
A. InternalEnforcement

The TRIPs Agreement requires member countries to ensure that
enforcement procedures as specified in the Agreement are made
available under national laws, particularly with regard to intellectual
property rights covered under the Agreement."' In addition, the
Agreement specifies the terms on which such enforcement
procedures are to be administered. These terms include an
expeditious process,149 written decisions,' 5° and an opportunity for
judicial or administrative review.' 5 ' The Agreement, however, curtails
the breadth of these requirements by not requiring special
The
enforcement structures or processes be established.1 2
construction of Article 41 leaves open the question of what exactly
developing countries are required to undertake internally in order to
comply with the TRIPs Agreement. Where, for example, a developing
country does not have a judicial system that is equipped to provide
the "due process" requirements of the TRIPs Agreement, 53 may such

147. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 41.
148. See id. This provision leads one back to a question which shadows
this article-what precisely is a trade related intellectual property right? Put
differently, at what point does a violation of the Paris Convention or the Berne
Convention translate into a TRIPs Agreement violation? Or does a violation of one
result in a per se violation of the TRIPs Agreement?
149. Id. art. 41(2).
150. Id. art. 41(3).
151. Id. art. 41(4).
152. Id. art. 41(5).
153. See Id. art. 42.
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a country rely on the built-in limitation to Article 41 which provides
that there is no obligation to put in place a distinct judicial system
for the enforcement of intellectual property rights? While one might
perhaps argue that there exists an obligation under the Agreement to
ensure that the existing judicial system is adapted to facilitate TRIPs
Agreement enforcement, there is still the question of the extent that a
developing country must go to comply with Articles 41(2), (3), (4), and
(5) of the Agreement. This is particularly the case for developing
countries which, for the most part, lack resources to devote to
extensive judicial processes. It may be argued that Article 41(5),
which specifically provides that members do not have to expend
additional sums of money for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights under the TRIPs Agreement, simply implies that developing
country members have to use a "good faith" effort to comply with the
enforcement provisions.
There is a significant question about the types of remedies that
the TRIPs Agreement provision envisages.
Many of these remedies,
such as injunctions or criminal penalties,' 55 are unfamiliar to the
subject matter of real property law, and thus, will not be easily
imported into existing legal doctrines in these countries. In addition,
the provisions for criminalizing counterfeiting or copyright piracy is
sure to create unrest in those countries where, as explicated earlier,
cultural models remain deeply embedded in the economic and legal
structure. Indeed, the question will invariably arise as to whether
the broader legal and political framework existing in these countries
will not be largely incompatible with these sanctions.
Finally, there remains the question of invoking the TRIPs
Agreement before a national court. Fundamental to the enforcement
of TRIPs Agreement provisions is the existing knowledge base within

the judiciary and practicing bar about intellectual property rights.
The TRIPs Agreement requires the enforcement of all rights within a
maximum of ten years--rights which developed countries were
privileged to formulate, adapt, and assimilate over a period lasting
more than a century. In addition, these rights and remedies resonate
within the pre-existing legal, social, and economic framework of
developed countries.
What the TRIPs Agreement ultimately asks of developing
countries is that they conform to a system and philosophy of laws
and values which are alien, and in some cases, in direct conflict with
frameworks which historically have sustained these societies. While
this is not impossible and in fact may be desirable, it would be
wishful to assume that enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement will take
place without some form of internal resistance, however this is

154.
155.

See Id. arts. 44-46.
See id. art. 61.
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manifested. After all, even countries must learn how to walk before
being asked to leap.
B. External Enforcement
External enforcement refers to the prospects of trade sanctions
as a motivating force to secure compliance by developing countries.
The threshold question in this regard is the process by which the
TRIPs Agreement is triggered under the broader auspices of the WTO
system. Does triggering depend on the results or lack thereof of
internal enforcement? If so, will a developing country be required
under the TRIPs Agreement to enact legislation complying with a
WTO Panel decision, even if compliance with such a decision
arguably violates another WTO provision (e.g., Article 41(5))? What
happens when a developing country simply cannot, for structural
reasons, police the application of the TRIPs Agreement domestically?
This was recently the case with the resolution of the United StatesChinese trade conflict over the protection of intellectual property
rights. '1 6 Despite overt attempts by the government to enforce
intellectual property rights, the number of obstacles in a country as
big and geographically diverse as China simply proved too much. It
appears again that in this context, just like the pre-TRIPs Agreement
era, what may reasonably be required of a developing country is that
the country employ consistent good faith efforts to secure compliance
with the TRIPs Agreement.
The threat of trade sanctions, while useful, cannot in itself
accomplish enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement. The core issue in
developing countries is development-that is, the need for

infrastructure, the provision of basic human needs, the guarantee of
basic human rights, and the upward mobility of the people in
general. Intellectual property rights, as a sub-set of a larger body of
rights prescribed by public law, will remain difficult to enforce in
countries whose priorities still remain the provision of fundamental
amenities to its people. In light of such priorities, intellectual
property rights, divorced from perceived immediate needs of a
country, will likely be treated as luxuries. As a result, even the
decision to use trade sanctions as a means of external enforcement
must be circumscribed by political wisdom on the part of developed
countries, depending on the internal situation of specific developing
countries. 7 In the meantime, however, the substantive issue of

156. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
157. The United States used this approach, for example, in the former
U.S.S.R., with regards to intellectual property infringement and even human
rights violations, preferring to turn a blind eye out of a higher concern to pursue
political and economic stability in the region.
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when to use either external enforcement or internal enforcement and
the larger question-can both processes proceed simultaneously' 58must still be resolved.
C. Developing Countries and the Dispute Resolution Understanding
Developing countries faced a series of problems particular to
them in the pre-Uruguay Round dispute resolution mechanisms
provided under GATT.' 59 As a result, special procedures were
established to facilitate the effectiveness of the dispute resolution
process on their behalf.
This "padding" attempt, however, was
only barely used. 61 The reason obviously was the economic disparity
between developed and developing countries. This disparity was
exemplified and brought to the forefront in 1983 with the United
States-Nicaragua dispute over quotas for sugar.162
A GATT panel ruling determined that the U.S. quota system
violated GATT rules and constituted an impairment of Nicaragua's
benefits under GATT. 63 The United States, however, indicated that it
would not stop the practice. 64 Nicaragua obviously had the option of
sanctioning the United States, but in reality, this option was
unavailable to it as a developing country. Sanctions against a
country as big as the United States would have barely made an
impact. In addition, it could have exposed Nicaragua to other
detrimental foreign policy actions taken against it by the United
States.
An earlier complaint made by Brazil to the GATT panel against

European Union sugar export subsidies also highlights the practical
issues developing countries must confront in any multilateral
regime.165 Although the GA1T panel ruled in favor of Brazil,

158. This author would argue yes, as internal enforcement may raise
different legal issues or implicate a different body of intellectual property law than
government pursued enforcement does. It is easy, however, to see an argument
develop maintaining that such double routes of enforcement are per se
Illegitimate.
159. For a brief overview of these problems, see JACKSON ET AL., supra note
10, at 346.
160. See Procedures under Article XXIII, Apr. 5, 1966, GATT B.I.S.D. (14th
Supp.) at 18.
161. JACKSON ETAL., supra note 10, at 347.
162. United States-Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, Mar. 13, 1984, GATT
B.I.S.D. (3 1st Supp.) at 67.
163. Id. at 74.
164. Id. at 72.
165. See European Communities-Refunds on Exports-Complaint by
Brazil, Nov. 10, 1980, GATT, B.I.S.D. (27th Supp.) at 69; see also, Maria Marta
Ching, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the GATT Dispute Settlement System for
Developing Countries, 16 WORLD COMPETIMON L. & EcON. REv. 81 (1992).
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European Union compliance with the panel continued to be a source
of complaint. The degree to which a defendant nation can ignore or
prevaricate in complying with a final decision against it and get
away with 66It is a significant problem for all multilateral
agreements.1
One of the great strengths of the WTO system is the new dispute
resolution process which favors a rule-oriented approach to dispute
1 67
resolution. The use of the system is mandatory under the WTO.
Under the DSU, the dispute resolution process is stream-lined, and
time periods between decisions and enforcements effectively
shortened. 6 8 The DSU eliminates the possibility of blocking a panel
report which was a serious problem in the old GATT system. There is
an appellate body which is authorized to consider issues of law and
legal interpretations applied by the panel. 6 9 Under this new system,
there is an increased chance that measures taken against developing
countries by developed countries will be subject to greater scrutiny.
Article 21.3 of the DSU requires a losing party to indicate what steps
it plans to take in implementing the panel's recommendations.
Where these recommendations are not implemented, the prevailing
1 70
party is entitled to seek compensation or to suspend concessions.
As a package deal, the new process significantly reduces the
possibilities of procedural abuse or manipulation by member states.
The new and improved dispute resolution procedure, however, cannot
avail to developing countries a system that delivers substantive gains
for them. Where a major economic power like the European Union or
the United States refuses to comply with a panel report, the
unfortunate result is that the process is discredited. When this
happens to a developing country outside of a TRIPs Agreement
context, the legitimacy of TRIPs Agreement enforcement within the
process is also implicated. The success of enforcement for the TRIPs
Agreement is thus dependent on the general success of the DSU and
the perception by developing countries that the system works for
developed and developing nations alike.

166. See generally, Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the
World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985) (noting the U.S. withdrawal from
submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice).
167. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, art. 23.1. Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1; 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).
168. See, e.g., td. art. 17 (limiting appellate proceedings to 90 days
maximum, although the recommended period is 60 days); id. art. 15 & Appendix

3 (regulating time for issuance of the panel report once the panel is established).
169. See id. art. 17.
170. See id. art. 22.1.
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V. CONCLUSION

The TRIPs Agreement has certainly clipped the wings of
developing countries, if only by accomplishing a de facto adherence
to the two main conventions on international protection of
intellectual property.17 ' But, as this Article has argued, the real
challenge facing developing countries in their development objectives
is a need to evaluate traditional strategies for overall development
goals rather than focus primarily on the international proprietary
system. Studies which find that foreign patent applications increase
with the rate of economic development reinforce the need for
developing countries to embark on comprehensive development
strategies addressing areas such as education, market reform, and
stable economic policies regarding foreign investment. In particular,
poorer developing countries will find that focusing solely on
technology transfer issues and devising ways to make the most of the
TRIPs Agreement will not bring about the conditions or opportunities
for growth that is so badly needed.
In addition to the specific areas discussed in this Article, the
TRIPs Agreement has as its greatest obstacle the costs of education,

administration, and implementation. Most developing countries will
struggle with these issues for some time to come.
Developed
countries wrongly presume that the intellectual property system, as
conceived in Western tradition, has an intuitive logic that developing
countries will somehow grasp. Developed countries underestimate
the degree to which local institutions, traditional ideas, and social
values will resist a wholesale acceptance and application of the
philosophy of intellectual property rights, and consequently, the
TRIPs Agreement.
It is not possible to generalize about the impact of all the
categories of intellectual property covered by the TRIPs Agreement.
In some areas, such as trademarks, developing countries stand to
benefit from increased protection which may limit the number of
substandard goods circulating in their markets. These goods flow
from piracy and counterfeiting activity, as well as from multinationals
who are able to reduce costs of manufacture through the use of
substandard materials. In the prime area of copyright, significant
issues remain unresolved, particularly with regard to enforcement
mechanisms and the interpretation of certain Berne Convention
articles which were incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement. In the
patent area, the incorporation of Article 5 of the Paris Conventionwhich has long been a sore spot in the international relations of the
patent system and which essentially accomplishes a defacto revision

171.

India, for example, did not adhere to the Paris Convention but now Is

subject to its major provisions via the TRIPs Agreement.
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of the Paris Convention in directions previously resisted by
developing countries-portends conflict over judicial constructions of
terms not explicitly defined under the TRIPs Agreement or the Paris
Convention.
An ingenious twist to the new WTO system is the distinction
drawn between least developing countries and developing
countries. 1 2 The distinction appears to be more functional than
anything else, at least in the context of the TRIPs Agreement. Quite
clearly, countries categorized as least developing do not pose an
immediate or significant danger in the area of intellectual property
infringement. In addition, these countries may be of little or no
significance to the economic interests of developed countries.
Consequently, they are exempted from application of the TRIPs

Agreement for ten years.1 73

The battlefield, reminiscent of the

attempts to revise the Berne Convention at Stockholm, will clearly be
over the question of what a least developing country is,'74 and more
importantly, over who gets to determine this.1 7 5 The distinction is
important, however, because it prevents free riding by developing
countries who can afford the transition to the complex system of
international intellectual property protection as envisaged under the
TRIPs Agreement.
The overall prospects of TRIPs Agreement enforcement will be
determined in large part by the general efficacy of the dispute
resolution process of the WTO.
The willingness of developing
countries to comply with WTO decisions will correspond to the degree
to which the system is perceived as being equitable, as well as the
degree to which the TRIPs Agreement is interpreted to permit
development objectives to be meaningfully implemented. Finally, it is
important to observe that the protection of intellectual property rights
within the auspices of the WTO effectively links the well-being of the
entire system of world trade to the success of the TRIPs Agreement
and vice versa. This perhaps is the greatest source of enforcement
prospects for the TRIPs Agreement. History suggests, however, that
this may also be its Achilles heel.

172. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 66.
173. See Id.
174. See, e.g.. Eleanor D. O'Hara. "Developing Countrles"--A Definitional
Exercise, 15 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 83 (1967) (discussing various proposed

definitions of "developing countries").
175. Currently, different standards determine what country is regarded as
"developing." The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development all use relatively different
yardsticks in making this determination. While some countries invariably fall into
all three classifications, others, such as Singapore or China, do not.

